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REMOVAL OF OUTMODED RESTRICTIONS
Guy W. BoTrsO

The development of urban living in Florida early made it necessary and desirable for the prudent home owner to seek a residential
area where he could be assured of peaceful and pleasant surroundings,
safe from the encroachment of commercial structures, substandard
residential construction, and other uses of the adjoining land that
might disturb the peaceful and consistent pattern of life in the neighborhood chosen for his home. Owners of land often desired to limit the
use of land sold in order to benefit land retained for their own use or
to accomplish some other personal or business purpose. The vehicle
most commonly used to accomplish these purposes was the restrictive
covenant, which limits and qualifies the use of land. Restrictions were
often impressed or imposed upon subdivisions or tracts of land by
"blanket restrictions" limiting the use of all parts of the lands by a
general scheme. In other transactions these restrictions were contained
in separate instruments of conveyance. If the latter method was used,
the conveyances often reserved to the vendor a possibility of reverter
or a right of re-entry for condition broken, to ripen upon a breach
of the restrictive covenant or condition. The reverter and right of
entry, plus the right to enforce restrictive covenants, have constituted
the sanctions that enable one with a proper interest to enforce restrictive covenants. Although there has been no consistent pattern in the
type of restrictions imposed or in the type of sanction employed to
enforce them, such restrictions have generally been enforced by the
courts if they were expressed in any of the above forms, and this enforcement often continued for many years after the restrictions had
ceased to confer any benefit upon the owners. Changes in neighborhoods, improvements in building practices, changes in architectural
designs, and a variety of other factors operate to render some of the
best planned restrictive covenants obsolete and detrimental to the
property intended to be benefited by their existence.
Inasmuch as restrictions must be considered enforceable until
eliminated in a legally accepted manner, they have in the past and do
now frequently present substantial impediments to proposed real
estate transactions, since buyers are often unwilling to purchase propOLL.B. 1937, University of Florida; Member of Jacksonville, Florida, Bar.
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OUTMODED RESTRICTIONS

erty if its use is burdened by obsolete restrictions. The purpose of this
article, therefore, is to explore the various possibilities available for
the removal of restrictions that have become outmoded and, as an
incident thereto, to survey in a general way the Florida judicial decisions that have dealt with the problem. For anyone desiring to study
the nature and legal characteristics of restrictive covenants, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, and other property interests involved, there are many scholarly' treatises and articles available in
any complete law library.
NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN GENERAL

In Florida, covenants restraining the free use of real property, although not favored, will nevertheless be enforced by courts of equity
if the intention of the parties is dear in their creation and the restrictions and limitations are confined to a lawful purpose and are within
reasonable bounds., Although the courts seemingly entertain an unfavorable attitude toward restrictions by construing them "in favor
of the free and unrestricted use of real property," 2 little difficulty is
encountered today if the covenant was carefully drawn to impose the
usual building restrictions. Courts of equity enforce them in order
to prevent fraud and unfair dealing on the part of one who purchases
land burdened with restrictions or who contracts directly for their
existence. 3
Theories of Enforcement
The decisions dealing with enforceability of restrictive covenants
are based on the doctrine set forth in Tulk v. Moxhay,4 which held
that a restrictive covenant may be enforced in equity irrespective of
its enforceability at law. It is somewhat surprising to find that the two
most important theories of enforcement employed by the courts today
were developed from language used in different portions of this famous
English decision, because the theories are considered to be in conflict.5
The two theories are the "contract" theory and the "equitable servitude or easement" theory. The first theory justifies the enforcement
'Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 106 So. 901 (1925).
2Ibid.
sSee Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 571, 147 So. 862, 867 (1933).
42 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
5Note, 39 VA. L. Rv. 703 (1953).
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of restrictions as contracts concerning the land, while the second justifies the enforcement as servitudes upon the land similar to easements
and profits.6
It seems settled that the Supreme Court of the State of Florida has
adopted the contract theory, for it has said in Osius v. Barton:7
"The theory adopted in this State is that the contract which
embodies the restriction may be enforced against both the promisor and those who take from him with notice, thereby including
amongst those who may enforce the obligation not only the
promisee, but those who take from him and those in the neighborhood who may be considered as beneficiaries of the contract."
The choice of theories is of some theoretical and practical importance and has been a subject of conflict and debate among the courts
and the various writers on that subject.8 Some critics contend that the
contract theory affords no theoretical basis sufficient to justify the
9
running of the restriction with the land. They argue that the exisand that the restrictions do
sufficient
tence of the contract itself is not
not contain the further element of privity of estate, which normally
justifies the running of real covenants. Although there is some basis
for this argument, it affords no real impediment conceptually because
restrictions can be enforced against takers with notice by application
of an estoppel theory. 10
It should be observed that, while specifically disclaiming the requirements of privity of contract and privity of estate, the courts apply
the contract theory to the extent that a right of action is accorded
various individuals as third party beneficiaries of the primary contract., Under this construction, anyone purchasing in reliance on
the restrictions may sue any other taker with notice regardless of
whether the person being sued was a prior or subsequent purchaser
or was a party to the deed."2 This broad extension has been criti6See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS

7109

171 (2d ed. 1947).

Fla. 556, 571, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933). See also Board of Public Instruction

v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
sSee CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 171-77 and the various authorities cited by

the author.
cit. supra note 6, at 172.
loSee CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 172-73.
9See CLARK, Op.

"1Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
12Ibid.
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cized on the ground that it is often difficult to find that the remote
party exercising his "right" was the intended beneficiary of the primary contract.' 3 This criticism is not too disturbing in the normal
case, since the common grantor would certainly intend to benefit all
subsequent grantees in the development by conferring on them the
ability to promote the continuance of the restrictions through legal
enforcement.
Acceptance of the equitable servitude theory, on the other hand,
causes little conceptual difficulty concerning the running of the restrictive covenants. They are considered appurtenant to the land,
like easements and profits, and therefore run with the land as a servitude.' 4 Although this theory avoids the difficulty of justifying the
running of the restriction and the rights accorded third party beneficiaries, it still presents the problem of whether the Statute of Frauds
applies to a covenant as an interest in land.' 5 These difficulties in
logic are generally insignificant today because the two theories have
almost merged, and the results of the decisions made pursuant to the
two are usually identical.' 6 The important factors to be remembered
by Florida practitioners are that these restrictions are usually enforceable and that this right of enforcement can be accorded to many
remote individuals.
Reverters and Rights of Entry
As mentioned above, restrictions on the use of land are often imposed by the creation of a determinable fee with a possibility of a
reverter or by the creation of a fee simple on a condition subsequent
with a right of entry for condition broken. In some instruments these
devices appear to be inserted as "sanction" or "enforcement" clauses,
whereas in others a true fee simple determinable or fee simple upon a
-condition subsequent is created. If the former method is employed
the restrictions themselves are phrased as covenants or conditions and
the enforcement clause is added to provide for a reversion or right of
entry if any of the covenants are violated. If the latter method is
utilized the granting clause of the deed itself is phrased as a determin"3See

CLARK, op. cit. supra note

6, at 173-74; 3

TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

501-04

(3d ed. 1939).

l4See CLRK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 175.
"5See Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 167 N.E. 441 (1929).
16Ibid.
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able fee or fee simple conditional, with the continuance of the estate
granted dependent upon the continued observance of the restrictions.
Restrictions phrased in either manner will be enforced, although there
might be some question in a particular case as to whether the phrases
used constitute a reversion or a right of entry for condition broken.17
It should be observed, however, that normally restrictions are created
without use of the reverter or right of entry. This is the more desirable
means, as a recent legislative enactment concerning the length of time
a reverter or forfeiture may run seems to limit the usefulness of a
reverter.18 In addition, the propriety of removing restrictions or
quieting title against a reverter is doubtful. 19 These two aspects of
the problem will be discussed more fully below when the methods and
means of removal are generally explored.
Time Limitations
Once it has been determined that restrictions placed upon the use
of land are enforceable and run with the land, it should be determined
if there is any limitation placed upon the length of time these restrictions may run. Even in the absence of any express limitation in the
instrument, it is settled that if the circumstances require limitation
the restrictions may run for only a reasonable length of time.20 The
implied limitation does not operate independently or automatically
but requires a judicial determination that a reasonable time has transpired and that the restrictions are ineffective. Restrictions may run
indefinitely unless a judicial body determines to the contrary or the
Rule Against Perpetuities imposes some limitations. The rule, however, usually affords no comfort to those seeking to avoid the restrictions, for it is clear that there is no violation of the rule if the
restriction is in the form of a covenant or a reversion. 2' This wellsettled rule is based upon the rationale that restrictions are outside the
rule because they are not estates in land and that reversions do not violate the rule because they are interests in real property which are
vested from their creation. Although the Supreme Court of Florida
does not appear to have decided this specific issue, it has enforced
"7See Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948).
18FLA. STAT. §689.18 (1955).

19See Goldstein, Rights of Entry
Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HAmv. L.
2oBarton v. Moline Properties, Inc.,
2"See 7 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY

and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to
REv. 248, 266, 271 (1940).
121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
§3571 (perm. ed. 1940).
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restrictions expressed as covenants and reversions without questioning
22
their apparently unlimited duration.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRAcT

DOCTmNE

The implications and effects of the recognition in Florida that
restrictions on the use of land are contracts concerning the land rather
than an interest in the land are several. In the first place, grantees
and other inhabitants of the neighborhood are entitled to obtain
relief by means of enforcement or cancellation, if they can show that
the covenant was imposed for their benefit. 23 The Court stated in
Osius v. Barton24 that a uniform plan of development, which would
indicate the presence of mutual consideration among the various
grantees and thereby create an enforceable promise, was unnecessary
because "here the beneficial interest of the complainants is otherwise
made to appear." The absence of the requirement of consideration
gives a strong indication that the parties are accorded this right as
third party beneficiaries. The belief is further strengthened by the
following language of the Court: "The rule is well established that...
those suffering from a breach... may be afforded relief in equity upon
a showing that the covenant was for their benefit as owners of neighbor25
ing properties."
Under such a decision a right of enforcement must be extended to
grantees, prior and subsequent, and owners of the adjoining lots if the
proper equitable circumstances exist. A person seeking the removal
or cancellation of restrictions by agreement or judicial determination
must be mindful of such a possibility and see that all of the interested
parties have been bound or have relinquished their rights.
Adoption of the contract theory further implies that agreements
imposing restrictions are not within the Statute of Frauds, 26 since
the restrictions themselves are not interests in land but are merely
contracts con&rning the land. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida does
not seem to have rendered a decision that squarely disposes of this
22Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948) (reversion); Heisler v.
Marceau, 95 Fla. 135, 116 So. 447 (1928) (restriction).
23Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
241d. at 565, 147 So. at 866.
251d. at 563, 147 So. at 865.
26FLA. STAT. §725.01 (1953), which is the Florida codification of the Statute
of Frauds.
2
7See Note, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 82, 88 (1952).
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question; but if it should be presented in the future a negative disposition would seem in order if the contract theory is to be followed.
The Court has decided that agreements creating easements should
be in written form,2 but, since in this jurisdiction a restriction has
been clearly distinguished from an easement or servitude, the holding
is apparently not in point and should not control a decision concerning restrictions on the use of land. In cases arising in Florida this
problem is unimportant or irrelevant if the person seeking the enforcement is a third party beneficiary. In such a case the complainant
would be enforcing his rights derived from the primary contract,
which itself would satisfy the statute.
Frustration of Purpose
A third implication and effect of the adoption of the contractual
theory is that restrictions may be terminated as any other contractual
obligation when the object or purpose of the restriction has been or
will surely be frustrated.29 In the Osius case the Court recognized and
followed this doctrine. The reason given by the Court for not granting
specific performance or allowing continued life for the restrictions
was that there had been such a change in the character of the neighborhood, not brought about by a breach of the party seeking the relief,
that the enforcement would only tend to harass the parties without
accomplishing the original purpose for which they were created. 30
The Court specifically held that this result was based "upon what is
now the generally accepted principle of contract law known as discharge of contractual obligation by frustration of contractual object," 3'
and cited section 288 of the Restatement of Contracts. A closer
look at this section indicates that three circumstances must exist before relief is justified: (1)The object or effect desired to be obtained
must have been the basis for entering into the agreement, (2) this
object or effect will surely be frustrated, and (3) the party seeking the
relief is without fault in causing the frustration and will be harmed
unless a discharge is granted. This is the most useful and widely used
means of avoiding restrictions on the use of land.
This doctrine of frustration by change of circumstances has also
2sCanell v. Arcola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953).
29Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
301d. at 569, 147 So. at 867.
311d. at 570, 147 So. at 867.
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been applied in several cases to remove city zoning regulations.32 In
one case the Court held that obsolete restrictions run afoul of the
public welfare, 33 while in another case obsolete restrictions were voided
on the ground that they were confiscatory. 34 The latter reason seems
more in accord with the general rule of law that confiscatory restrictions are invalid on due process grounds. Such decisions are helpful as
a practical matter because restrictions are often imposed by both the
original grantor and the city through its zoning regulations.
Since the Osius decision the Florida Supreme Court has not only
relied upon the doctrine of frustration to deny specific performance
but has granted affirmative relief to parties seeking the removal of
outmoded restrictions. 35 It is very difficult to determine from the
decisions exactly what circumstances will justify relief under the
change-of-neighborhood doctrine. The Court itself has said, "In cases
like this, each particular controversy . . . must be decided on the
equities of each particular situation as it is presented."3 In another
decision the Court mentioned that "each case must stand or fall on
the equities presented." 37 This attitude seems to compel a judicial
determination, although many practitioners might recommend a conveyance without such determination if they felt that there had been
sufficient change in the neighborhood. This procedure is recommended only when there is present some special circumstance that
would prevent a binding adjudication, such as the inability to join
the proper parties. It can be generally observed that the encroachment
of business,38 the change in the need for residential structures, 39 and
the disturbance of the peaceful character of the neighborhood because
of increased traffic and other noises 0 are important factors in any
determination of the issue. Of these, the encroachment of business is
probably the most important, for it indicates very graphically the
change in the character of the neighborhood.
32Siegel v. Adams, 44 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1950); Miami Beach v. First Trust Co.,
45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950).
33Siegel v. Adams, 44 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1950).
34Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950).
35Dade County v. Thompson, 146 Fla. 66, 200 So. 212 (1941) (canceling restrictions); Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp. v. Bishop, 120 Fla. 623, 163 So. 214 (1985)
(denying specific performance).
36Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 695, 164 So. 551, 556 (1935).
37Dade County v. Thompson, 146 Fla. 66, 68, 200 So. 212, 218 (1941).
38Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
39Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp. v. Bishop, 120 Fla. 623, 168 So. 214 (1985).
40Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 688, 164 So. 551 (1985).
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A review of certain decisions in this area of the law indicates that
a party may have to prove more than a substantial change in the
character of the neighborhood in order to receive the relief he desires.
In Allen v. Avondale

41
Co.

the Court held that, although the

changes shown to have taken place would ordinarily be sufficient to
grant relief from the enforcement of the covenants, the complainant
purchased his land after the changes had taken place and was on
notice of them; this was considered sufficient to prevent the granting
of relief. The record also indicated that most of the changes had
taken place on an adjoining subdivision and that the covenants had
only fourteen months to run by the terms of the instruments themselves. Although this case might be distinguished on the ground that
the Court merely considered the taking with notice as one of many
circumstances determining the outcome, the opinion indicates that
42
notice alone may be a sufficient reason to deny relief.
In Barton v. Moline Properties43 the Court, after upholding the
lower court's invalidation of restrictions on the authority of Osius v.
Barton, decided upon rehearing that the doctrine expressed in both
the original hearing and in the Osius case should be modified for
4
future guidance. The Court stated: 4
"Where, however, it appears that such covenant or restriction is
for the exclusive benefit of and that it is still of substantial value
to the dominant lot, notwithstanding the changed condition of
the neighborhood . . . a court of equity will restrain its violation."
This restriction of the doctrine of frustration could seriously limit
efforts to invalidate restrictions, especially if the owner of the dominant estate took an adversary attitude by presenting proof of the continuing benefit he enjoyed from the restrictions.
The actual effect of this qualification on later decisions appears
to be uncertain. The Court has called it a "slight qualification" in
41135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
42d. at 8, 185 So. at 138; but see the concurring opinion, which affirmed the
decision of the lower court on the ground that there had not been sufficient change,
especially in consideration of the fact that the change occurred on the adjoining
subdivision.
43121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
441d. at 683, 164 So. at 557.
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one opinion45 and has relied on it in a concurring opinion in another
case.46 When the Barton case has been specifically followed, however,
it appears that it was cited to uphold the principle in the majority
opinion to the effect that restrictions should be allowed to run only
for a reasonable time if no fixed time limit is contained in the in47
strument.
The conclusion can be drawn that the qualification is in fact a
slight one, and that the governing principle is still tht announced in
Osius v. Barton. In actual practice, it might also be concluded that
the evidence sufficient to prove a continuing benefit to the dominant
estate is sufficient to prove that there has occurred no change in the
character of the neighborhood of such a substantial nature as to
justify the removal of restrictions.
OTHER MErMODS OF REMOVAL
It is important to remember that, while the affirmative and negative relief granted by courts pursuant to the doctrine of frustration of
contractual purpose is perhaps the most important vehicle for the
removal of outmoded restrictions from land, it is not the only
remedy available. All of the rules pertaining to the termination of
easements and profits apply. Abandonment by the dominant owners,
the doctrine of laches, acquiescence in a breach, and violation of the
restrictions by the other owners are sufficient grounds for relief and
defense. 48 The existence of these conditions is more often used as
a defense to a violation than as a ground for affirmative action to invalidate restrictions. Attorneys experienced in handling realty transactions acquire the ability to distinguish between situations in which
violations may be defended on the basis of abandonment, laches, or
similar violations by parties otherwise in a position to complain and
situations giving no such protection. Title companies also develop
a certain ability to determine what actual or incipient violations cannot be enjoined for similar reasons. A practitioner confronted with
outmoded restrictions that impede a realty transaction or improvement
will do well, therefore, to examine the situation to see if he can with
45Osius v. Barton, 129 Fla. 184, 189, 176 So. 65, 67 (1937).
46A~len v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
47Siegel v. Adams, 44 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1950); Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45
So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950); Port St. Joe Dock & Terminal Ry. v. Maddox, 140 Fla. 110,

191 So. 775 (1939).
48Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
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If he believes it is safe to do so because of some extraneous circumstance or situation but desires to have fiscal validity for his opinion,
he should pose the problem to an insurer of titles. Very often such an
insurer is quite willing to assume those risks.
Restrictions are also terminable by release, merger, mutual agree49
ment, eminent domain, and by the terms of the agreement itself.

If a release or an agreement to terminate is to be binding and is to
qualify as a total avoidance, the consent of all parties benefited by
the restriction must be acquired.50 The release is perhaps the most
practical and inexpensive means of removing outmoded restrictions,
but it may often be difficult to ascertain and locate the necessary
parties even if the parties are willing to relinquish their benefits. A
division of purpose among those entitled to enforce restrictions will
prevent removal by release or agreement, but when there is unanimity
this procedure should be used.
In appropriate situations, restrictions may be destroyed by merger.
This occurs as a result of the rule that the obligation arising out of a
promise respecting the use of land is extinguished whenever the right
to enforce and the obligation upon the promise rest in the same person. Or, stated another way, so far as the right to enforce the promise
is dependent upon ownership of an interest in one tract of land and
the obligation to perform it is dependent upon the ownership of an
interest in another tract, the obligation is extinguished by the vesting
of the two interests in a single ownership. This method is particularly
useful in getting rid of restrictions on an undeveloped subdivision
wholly acquired by one owner, who wishes to free the area from outmoded restrictions in order to change its use from that projected by
the restrictions, or who wishes to replace them with restrictions compatible with current development plans. If the restrictions were
placed on the property for the sole purpose of benefiting the property
encumbered and not for the benefit of adjoining land, the combining
in one owner of the right to enforce and the obligation to observe the
restrictions will cause a merger and the obligation will be extinguished.
A suit for declaratory decree is often indicated in order to insure the
property's marketability, free from the restrictions.
Apparently, in Florida the taking of property by eminent domain
for a public purpose gives the governmental authority the privilege of
497 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY

607

THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY

§§3640-51

(perm. ed. 1940).
§3646 (perm. ed. 1940).
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applying the property to a use prohibited by restrictions.51 The owners
of other lands similarly restricted have been held not to have such a
vested property right in having the restrictions maintained as will
support an award of compensation for the breach of the restrictions
by the condemning authority.52 This method of removing restrictions
is of course not available to a private person, but it is mentioned here
because of the implications it may have on other methods. The location of a school, public utility, office building, or other governmental
facility in an area restricted to residential use may well constitute
such a change in the neighborhood as will justify termination of the
restrictions on all surrounding property under the doctrine of frustration of contractual purpose.
Restrictions often are expressly made in covenants running with
the land for a specified number of years or until a specified date. Upon
the running of such a period or the arrival of the specific date the
restrictions normally terminate. Some questions arise, however, as to
whether restrictions running for specified numbers of years have expired by their terms when interim conveyances of the property are
made in such a manner as to leave it doubtful whether a given conveyance was made subject to the existing restrictions only or whether
a similar set of restrictions was imposed for a new period from the
date of some of the interim conveyances. If the existing restrictions
are set out verbatim and an additional reference is made in the interim conveyance to existing restrictions, it is usually safe to assume
that there has been no reimposition of the restrictions but only a conveyance subject to them. Again, restrictions with definite duration
often prohibit the construction of any building closer to streets than
the building or set-back line on the subdivision plat. The duration
of the plat and its building line restriction are not so limited. If
restrictions expire or are removed from the property, is the building
line restriction as shown on the plat still effective? While such setback restrictions may become effective by the mere dedication of a
plat, it is believed that when the restriction as shown on the plat is
separately imposed by deed or record restriction, the removal of the
latter also removes or renders inoperative the set-back line shown on
the plat.53
l'fBoard of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637
(Fla. 1955).
s2Ibid.

53Gardner v. Maffitt, 74 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. 1934).
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If outmoded restrictions are not removed by agreement or through
expiration of their term, and it is believed that they have expired
through merger of interest or otherwise, or are susceptible to removal
upon one of the bases mentioned above, a suit to declare the expiration
or decree the removal of the restrictions is usually necessary to obtain
an insurable and marketable title. The lawyer faced with the necessity for such a suit must select the proper action, determine the necessary parties, and marshal the facts supporting the decree desired.
In Florida the validity of restrictions on the use of land has been
adjudicated in an action to quiet title, 5 4 in an action for a declaratory
decree 55 when raised as a defense to an action seeking an injunction
against the violation of a restriction,56 in an action instituted by a bill
in equity to cancel the restrictions,57 by a cross bill filed in a suit for
injunction against violation, 56 and in an action for cancellation of a
contract for the sale of land.5 9 The existence of and the right to remove outmoded restrictions may also be adjudicated in a proceeding
to obtain a building permit or in one to recover purchase money paid
on a contract for the sale of land.60 Since the courts of equity have
been liberal in providing adjudication of this issue, it can be estimated that there are other means for determining this question if the
issue of validity of restrictions is at all relevant to the primary issue.
In the usual situation, an owner or a prospective purchaser who would
like to utilize the land for a purpose prohibited by restrictions finds
it necessary to have the status of the restrictions definitely determined
before proceeding. In these circumstances the owner should bring
an action to cancel the restrictions. The suit may be one to quiet
the owner's title or a suit for a declaratory decree, coupled with a
prayer for affirmative relief.
PROCEDURAL AsPEcTs OF SUIT FOR REMOVAL

In drafting a complaint to cancel restrictions as a cloud on title,
care should be taken to set out in detail the basis for the relief prayed.
v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551
S5Ballinger v. Smith, 54 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1951).
-oEdgewater Beach Hotel Corp. v. Bishop, 120 Fla. 623, 163
-Dade County v. Thompson, 146 Fla. 66, 200 So. 212 (1941).
5
SOsius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
5 9Port St. Joe Dock & Terminal Ry. v. Maddox, 140 Fla. 110,
6OVan Meter v. Manion, 170 Okla. 81, 38 P.2d 557 (1934)
Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
54Barton
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Since most cases will be based upon the "change of neighborhood"
or the "frustration of contract purpose" doctrine, it is important to
define in detail the character of the neighborhood when the restrictions were created and the changes relied upon that prove the original
contract purpose has been or will be frustrated through no fault of
the plaintiff. If rezoning is necessary to apply the land to its projected
use, this should be done in advance; and it should be shown by averment that the zoning of the property in question is consistent with
the neighborhood but inconsistent with the restrictions. If other members of the group to which the restrictions apply have violated them or
acquiesced in violations, this should be set out in the complaint.
Changes in traffic patterns should be explained, as should relocation
of highways, if important, and every other fact essential to show that
the petitioner in the particular case, judged alone, is entitled to have
a decree holding the restrictions to be inoperative and void.
Since restrictive covenants not only bind but also inure to the
benefit of those affected through ownership of land in the restricted
area, it is necessary to an effective decree that all parties interested be
made parties to the suit. A judgment will not bind a person not a
party to the suit.61 It is usually not too difficult to determine who
should be parties. All persons materially interested in the subject
matter of the litigation or whose substantial rights will be affected by
the adjudication should be included.62 The classic test for determining parties to this kind of litigation is to include all who are "touched
and concerned" by it. Embraced within this are certainly the owner
of every parcel of land subject to the same restriction, every person for
whose benefit the restriction was imposed, and every person who has a
right to enforce the restriction. More often than not the attorney preparing such a suit is dismayed less by determining who should be made
parties than he is by the numbers he finds who are necessary litigants.
But the necessity of having all parties before the court cannot be overemphasized. Failure to do so makes the suit subject to dismissal at
any stage, and if it proceeds to final adjudication it is not binding on
63
omitted parties.
The difficulty in locating the various parties and making them
amenable to the proceeding has been somewhat mitigated by the
purchase money).
elCharles H. Deeb, Inc. v. Kestner, 59 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1952).
02See McAdoo v. Moses, 101 Fla. 936, 132 So. 638 (1931).
1sCharles H. Deeb, Inc. v. Kestner Co., 59 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1952).
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ability to maintain these actions as class suits.64 The Court has spe-

cifically held that a suit to cancel restrictions is within the statute6 5
that provides for a representative defense by one or more persons when
the class they represent would be so numerous as to make it impractical
to bring all before the court. 66 It has also been said that the reason

for allowing class suits is that a remedy is made available that might
not otherwise exist.67

If the proper parties have been joined, either individually or by
representatives of a class, the judgment rendered is binding upon all
interested parties under the doctrine of res judicata and the matter
is forever settled. 68 A title so cleared should be readily acceptable by
any purchaser or insurable by any title company. In addition to
cancelling and removing the restrictions, the chancellor may also enjoin all parties from any future attempt to enforce them. 69 This is
the preferable way to have a decree issued, for it affords an additional
means of enforcement.
REMOVAL OF REVERTERS AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY

The courts in Florida have shown an enlightened attitude in dealing with the problems created by outmoded restrictions. At the same
time, their departure from common law concepts on rights of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken has made them reluctant to deal with reverters that are coupled with restrictions. This
problem is a legislative one. The Legislature took a step in the right
direction by passing a statute in 1951 to limit the length of time a reverter or forfeiture provision could run. 70 The durational limit of
twenty-one years was made applicable both to existing restrictions
and those to be created in the future. The last paragraph of the
statute appears to allow these restrictions to remain valid as covenants,
thereby eliminating only the reverter and forfeiture provisions. Thus,
the statute did not cancel the restrictions themselves, but only sought
to invalidate their enforcement by reverter or forfeiture clauses. In
view of the courts' hesitancy to cancel restrictions against a reverter or
64FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.6.
65Fla. Laws 1931, c. 14658, §14, now FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.6.
66Allen v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
67Tenney v. Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 129, 11 So.2d 188, 189 (1942).
68Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261 (1926).
69See Dade County v. Thompson, 146 Fla. 66, 200 So. 212 (1941).
70FLA. STAT. §689.18 (1953).
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right of entry, 71 this statute could have been a great aid, for it, when
used with the change-of-neighborhood doctrine, would allow the abolition of reverter provisions. In fact, the action to cancel the restrictions could have been brought directly, since the reversion provision
had been declared null and void. This is presumably what the complainant had in mind in Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal.72 The Court,
however, held the statute unconstitutional so far as it applied to existing restrictions. The reason given was that the provision unconstitutionally impairs the obligations of a contract, the savings clause being
ineffectual because it affords no remedy when, as in the present case, the
covenant had not been violated. This decision destroys any chances
of voiding restrictions in deeds now in existence. It will, of course, be
very helpful in the future, as the statute is valid as to reverters created
after its enactment.
The reluctance of courts to cancel restrictions against a possibility
of a reverter or a right of entry has been adverted to earlier.73 Generally, the theory is that cancellation would deprive a person of a
vested property right while enlarging the right of the holder of the
determinable fee or a fee subject to a condition subsequent.7 4 In
California two decisions of the intermediate court of appeal have
applied the doctrine of change of condition to a right of entry,75 and
there is also dictum of the Missouri Supreme Court to the same
effect.76 These seem to be the only jurisdictions to travel this previously
perilous ground. So far as a right of entry is concerned, however, it
can reasonably be argued that the grantee's estate is not enlarged but
merely becomes indefeasible when the restrictions, and thus the right
of entry, are canceled. 77 In considering the determinable fee, it is
recognized that the grantee's estate is enlarged When the reverter is
abolished; this is not different, however, from the windfall parties
often receive because of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the
Rule Against Perpetuities, and the statutes of limitations. The strong
public policy considerations involved should negative these conceptual
difficulties. Otherwise, land in Florida will remain subject to these
7'Goldstein, supra note 19.
7271 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954), 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 340 (1954).
73Goldstein, supra note 19.
74See Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 588, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (1932).
75Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. 2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934); Letteau v. Ellis,
supra note 74.
76Koehler v. Roland, 275 Mo. 573, 587, 205 S.W. 217, 221 (1918).
77Goldstein, supra note 19, at 274.
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restrictions, regardless of the change in conditions, if a reverter or
right of entry, prior to 1951, was coupled to restrictions.
There is another aspect of the decision in Biltmore Village, Inc. v.
Royal that is pertinent to the present discussion. The complainant in
that case had derived its title by means of a tax deed. The majority
of the Court felt that this fact was of no significance to the outcome
because another statute78 provided that covenants running with the
land survived a tax deed and remained enforceable. The majority
reasoned that, since the covenants survived, the question of whether
the statute voiding reverters and forfeitures was constitutional was
dearly presented. This decision implied, or assumed, that the possibility of a reverter survived the tax deed and was still effective to enforce the restrictions on the use of the land. The dissent took the contrary view. It reasoned that the reverter had been cut off by the execution of the tax deed because a tax deed gives rise to a new and independent title emanating from the state, free of any private right,
title, or interest of the prior owner or his privies.79 The dissent concluded that this new title was a fee simple devoid of any reverter and
hence did not present a title that could test the validity of a statute
invalidating reverters.
The dissent specifically stated that its main concern was for the
effect that the majority opinion had upon the question of the extinguishment of reverter clauses by tax deeds. There is no doubt that conveyancers, landowners, and title insurance companies entertain a like
concern.. Prior opinions of the Court had indicated that the reverters
would be cut off and that the grantee received a title free of such interests. 8 0 This seems to be the better result because the restrictions
themselves could still be enforced by judicial process even though the
reverter had been canceled. There would not be a forfeiture to some
remote party who in the normal situation would no longer have any
interest in the development. The doctrine of frustration would be
more easily available to bring about the cancellation of restrictions if
reverters were abolished.
But the majority opinion remains a threat, although it cannot be
considered a precise determination of the issue. The Court might make
a different determination if the question were squarely presented. It
78FLA4 STAT.

§192.33 (1953).

TCiting Stuart v. Stephanus, 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).
8ODudemaine v. Shaw, 153 Fla. 899, 16 So.2d 114 (1944); Wolfson v. Heins, 149
Fla. 499, 6 So.2d 858 (1942); Stuart v. Stephanus, supra note 79.
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has done so in a case involving an easement. 8' The doctrine that the
tax deed grantee receives a paramount title could be utilized to decide that the grantee receives a fee simple void of reversions and forfeitures, although the restrictions remain enforceable as covenants. 82
A decision consonant with that of the dissent may be compelled by
a recent legislative amendment to section 192.33 of Florida Statutes
1953 .3 The amendment affects the third, and last, unnumbered paragraph of the section. The two antecedent paragraphs provide that
a restriction or covenant running with the land, if of the usual type,
shall survive the issuance of the tax deed and be enforceable "to the
same extent that it would be enforceable against a voluntary grantee."
The unamended portion of the third paragraph provides that any
right that the former owner had to enforce restrictions against others,
except by means of forfeitures, rights of re-entry or reverters, shall survive to the grantee. The intent of this last paragraph seems to be that
the tax grantee may likewise enforce restrictions against other owners,
except by the forbidden means. It appears to be unnecessary to forbid
the use or enforcement of reverters by the grantee, because normally
reverters do not pass with the land but remain in the possession of the
original grantor who created the reversionary interest. 4 In fact, until
a decision in 1948,85 there existed a substantial question and conflict of
authority on the question of whether a reverter could be alienated.
With this observation in mind, it seems difficult to ascertain the intent and results of the recent amendment to this third paragraph. The
amendment, after re-enacting the prior third paragraph, then adds:
"... it being among other things the specific intention of the
legislature that all forfeitures, rights of re-entry, and reverter
rights shall be destroyed and shall not survive to the grantee in
such tax deed or master's deed or to his or its heirs, successors
and assigns." 88
The question presented by this amendment is whether the Legislature intended to abolish those reverters that would survive to and
be enforceable by the grantee or whether it intended to abolish the
B'Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 So.2d 858 (1942).
8
2See FLA. STAT. §192.33 (1953).
8sFla. Laws 1955, c. 29959.
S4See Comment, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 340 (1954).
BsRIchardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948).
S6Emphasis supplied.
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reverters that might be enforceable against the grantee after the tax
deed. The words and general construction of the section indicate that
the prior intent was incorporated in the amendment. It seems clear
that this construction of the amendment would not alleviate the
harshness of the rule in the Biltmore Village case because the reversionary interests there were held by the developer, who had not received
the right of enforcement, or reversionary interest, from any tax deed
but had probably retained it from its creation. It would likewise not
affect any other ordinary case, because, as indicated above, the reversions, rights of re-entry, and forfeitures do not pass with the land to
the grantee.
Undoubtedly, the Legislature had the Biltmore Village decision
in mind and intended to change the rule so that reverter rights would
not survive at all and would be unenforceable against the grantee.
This belief is fortified by the statement of the Legislature itself to the
effect that all forfeitures, rights of entry, and reverters are destroyed.
This expression would obviously seem conclusive if the enactment did
not go on to say "and shall not survive to the grantee." It is believed,
however, that the Court will give effect to the paramount intent of the
Legislature that reverters and reversions shall not survive the issuance
of a tax deed. Such a holding would be consistent with prior holdings
that a tax title creates a new source of title. It also squares with the
holding that ad valorem taxes are assessed against the land and not the
title, so that if the land is sold to satisfy the tax claim the new title
thus created should be as effective against the former owner of a reversionary interest as it is against the prior fee owner.
The conclusions to be drawn from a study in this field can be
briefly stated. In actual practice the most feasible and inexpensive
method for terminating restrictions is the release executed by all
parties capable of enforcing the restrictions. If this method is not
available, extinguishment by judicial decree based upon one of the
several grounds outlined above may be achieved. The most useful
ground is the "change of neighborhood" or "frustration of contractual
purpose" doctrine. Elimination by judicial decree is often expensive
and time-consuming.
Legislation clarifying the effect of tax deeds on reversionary interests is needed, unless a court decision removes the present ambiguity
in the statute.
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